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The Uncertain Future of
Administrative Law
Jeremy Kessler & Charles Sabel

I

n an interregnum, as the old order subsides and the new order struggles for
definition and recognition, debate is often Janus-faced: now looking backward in an anguished attempt to save the receding world or put it in its best
light; now looking forward to make the most of the possibilities for renewal that
the emergent world affords. Such is the situation in American administrative
law today. Under pressure for decades, the vulnerabilities of the administrative
state were cast in harsh relief by the electoral victory of Donald Trump. This victory helped reveal and accelerate the erosion of public confidence in traditional
models of growth and social mobility, the institutions of government, and the
governing elite. The return of the White House to Democratic control will do little to abate this erosion. Within the legal academy and the federal judiciary, the
long-smoldering debate between progressives and libertarian-minded conservatives over the New Deal legacy has burst into flames. Progressives defend current
arrangements–and the internal operations of the administrative state in particular–as harmonizing professional expertise, energetic presidential direction, and
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A volatile series of presidential transitions has only intensified the century-long conflict between progressive defenders and conservative critics of the administrative
state. Yet neither side has adequately confronted the fact that the growth of uncertainty and the corresponding spread of guidance–a kind of provisional “rule” that
invites its own revision–mark a break in the development of the administrative
state as significant as the rise of notice-and-comment rulemaking in the 1960s and
1970s. Whereas rulemaking corrected social shortsightedness by enlisting science
in the service of lawful administration, guidance acknowledges that both science
and law are in need of continual correction. Administrative law has the resources
to ensure that the provisionality of guidance does not lead to the abuses that conservatives fear. But to deploy those resources–and to carry through the reforms of
administrative organization that are their natural complement–progressives must
rethink their commitments to judicial deference to administrative authority and administrative deference to presidential authority, commitments on which the progressive defense of the administrative state currently depends.
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the rule of law. Their opponents see an autonomous administrative state, largely
playing by the rules that administrators have created for themselves, as a growing
threat to the balance of judicial authority, legislative sovereignty, and presidential democracy on which constitutional freedoms depend. This debate can be so
absorbing that its participants–losing sight of the mixture of achievements and
shortcomings that make the actual administrative state a vexation, but perhaps a
tolerable one, for the public–come to suspect that but for the machinations of the
other side, there would be no real problem at all.
But alongside this first debate is a second, focused resolutely, yet without fanfare, on what administrative law can or should become. Its point of departure is
the growing importance of uncertainty–the inability to anticipate future states
of the world with enough confidence to assign them probabilities–to administrative decision-making. As is often the case in the early stages of epochal change,
there is little attempt to give precise definition to the shift in progress, measure
its extent, or explain its causes. Instead we are confronted with arresting descriptions of new developments, counterintuitive to the world we thought we knew
and inexplicable but for the postulated break with the past.1
For one leading commentator, Adrian Vermeule, the rise of uncertainty turns
many substantive decisions into “coin flips,” foreclosing the reasoned ranking of
alternatives or “first order” reason-giving that makes administrative decisions orderly and intelligible to reviewing courts. Outcomes will depend on “second order” considerations having nothing to do with the law, such as the determination
that, right now, any decision is better than none, or that one policy is more easily
administrable than equally imperfect alternatives.2 Judges, recognizing this limit,
should–and, more often than not, do–defer broadly to administrative discretion
rather than futilely interrogate administrative actions that cannot be justified on
conventional grounds. For Vermeule, a strong administrative state, freed by the
judges themselves of all but the most minimal judicial check, is indispensable for
realizing the popular will in otherwise uncertain times. That such a state does not
conform to liberal democratic norms is no loss for Vermeule; that it invites domination by strong, popular leaders is if anything a gain.
For administrative law scholar Nicholas Parrillo, by contrast, the effect of uncertainty on the administrative state has been the “oceanic” spread of guidance:
a provisional form of regulation that tentatively advises private parties and public
officials about how an agency intends to exercise its discretion or interpret its legal authorities.3 In issuing guidance, an agency can give regulated entities an understanding of what compliance means right now, without committing itself to
what will be required of regulated entities in the near future, should conditions
change or new facts come to light. The public and private practitioners whose
views inform Parrillo’s account regard guidance as “essential to their missions.”
A former senior Food and Drug Administration official “cannot imagine a world
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without guidance”; according to one current Environmental Protection Agency
official, guidance is “the bread and butter of agency practice.”4
But just as a firm, having achieved economies of scale for efficiency reasons,
may use its size to compete unfairly, so Parrillo finds that the use of guidance as
a legitimate response to uncertainty can open the way to abuse. To advance their
own institutional interests or win the favor of particular constituents, administrators may use guidance too flexibly, avoiding the procedural burdens that normally
must be assumed to change policy, and frustrating the consistency required by the
rule of law. Or administrators may use guidance too inflexibly, knowing that, once
issued, guidance creates de facto legal obligations and permissions, and thus as a
practical matter can regulate with the force of law while again evading the procedures normally required to do so–and often judicial scrutiny as well.
For Parrillo, judicial efforts to winnow the good uses of guidance from the bad
have reached their limit. If guidance is to serve as an adaptive response to uncertainty while limiting the risks of abuse, the administrative state should itself be
reformed to further develop the institutional capacity for continuous but lawful
adjustment to change and variety. Parrillo calls this capacity “principled flexibility”: a method of decision-making in which requests for the revision of guidance are easily made (reducing the risk of expedient compliance by habit) and
exposed to appropriate discussion within the agency and its public (reducing the
risks of clientelism). Principled flexibility implies an innovation in administration, already visible in some agencies, that connects front-line decision-makers
with their superiors, on the one side, and regulatory parties and beneficiaries, on
the other, to ensure an integration of rule-application (or enforcement), rule-making, and rule-revision that conforms to the public interest and the rule of law, not
simply to the self-interest of an agency as an organization or its lobbies.
Neither Vermeule’s nor Parrillo’s views provide anything approaching a
comprehensive vision of a future administrative state, nor were they intended to
do so. In important ways, they are in error. But they do clear a path to exploring
how, in response to deep changes in the very circumstances of decision-making,
administration has begun to purposefully adapt, and might well emerge from
the interregnum better equipped to meet, effectively and legitimately, the demands of a volatile world. That is the path that we follow and try to extend in
this essay.
We begin with the premise that the growing reliance on guidance–a kind of
provisional “rule” that invites its own revision or qualification–marks a break in
the development of the administrative state on the order of the transition from
regulation by case-by-case adjudication to regulation by notice-and-comment
rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s. Where rulemaking aimed to correct social
shortsightedness by applying science in the service of lawful administration,
guidance–sprung from uncertainty–enables administration in the public inter-
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hough we want to show that the increase in uncertainty puts tectonic
pressure on the administrative state, we begin by arguing that legal reasoning, of the kind familiar to appellate courts, does not run out under
uncertainty. In suggesting otherwise, Vermeule adopts the vantage point of the
lone judge or administrator, deciding cases on the basis of records whose quality
gradually degrades as new and puzzling circumstances arise, beyond the range of
current understanding. When familiar sources of evidence become less reliable or
irrelevant, the only way to decide is by tossing a coin or appealing to second-order
reasons.
But uncertainty does not come to agencies in isolated instances or as a gathering nebulosity that defeats understanding. It arrives as a trickle, then a stream,
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est when both science and law are recognized as themselves in need of continual
correction. Guidance is the kind of law that uncertainty admits.
The centrality of guidance to contemporary administration, in turn, calls into
question politically progressive defenses of the administrative state. These defenses ground the legality and legitimacy of administrative decision-making in
the technical authority of professional administrators and the democratic authority of their political superiors, two forms of authority that are harmonized and
largely self-disciplined by internally generated hierarchical norms, which also
serve as a shield against intrusive judicial review. Today, such deference to authority and hierarchy seems incautious, even reckless. Even when understood as
a strategic bargain, necessary to protect the autonomy of the administrative state
from a judiciary suspected, often rightly, of congenital animosity to administration itself, the progressive defense resembles a pact with the devil.
The emerging law of guidance, and the reality of uncertainty to which it responds, points toward a different, and more defensible, conception of the administrative state, one that is aware of its own fallibility, that routinely invites challenges
to its technical and political authority, and that continually responds to these challenges with reasons that are legible to the courts and to the public at large.
This is an essay in reinterpretation, and exploratory reinterpretation at that.
Few if any of the observations or references to empirical developments are original to us. What is different is the perspective. Most commentators, and especially the ones from whom we have learned the most, strive to fit guidance within
an overarching structure of mutually reinforcing doctrinal and organizational elements: the traditional administrative state, put in its best light. When the fit is
awkward, the commentators, as the excellent lawyers they are, explain the discrepancy while preserving the structure. We see the same incongruities and ask
instead if they might not prefigure a new frame and, if so, how elements of a reconfigured administrative state might fit into it. We go just far enough in that direction, we hope, to suggest the plausibility of switching figure and ground.
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and then a flood of indications that new approaches are needed. Often it is the
agency itself that makes the limits of knowledge manifest and actionable, by proposing to set a standard at or beyond the frontier of technology and, in doing so,
calling attention to the uncertainty that must be overcome to make compliance
eventually possible. Either in response to puzzling novelty or as part of a deliberate effort to press beyond the known, the agency actively seeks the cooperation of
all the actors in a position to learn a way through uncertainty. Such cooperation
is likely to be forthcoming as regulators, regulated entities, and the beneficiaries
of regulation, jointly ignorant of the risks they may face, share a vulnerability that
can motivate joint action.5
There should be nothing surprising in such a reaction. We expect the rational
actor, facing uncertainty, to inquire after further information the better to direct
action. Nor should it be surprising, however, that organizing such inquiry is easier said than done. Ideally, when decisions are reversible and information is easily available, action and inquiry can proceed together, so that initial decisions are
corrected without loss in light of later knowledge, even if, that too, remains provisional. In fact, information is typically costly to acquire–not least because at the
outset of inquiry it is not clear what needs to be known–and decisions can turn
urgent and irreversible. Furthermore, inquiry can and from time to time does fail,
though failure does not discredit the enterprise as a whole, any more than science
as a whole is discredited by its reverses. In practice, what is called for in the face
of uncertainty is “measured action,” in which each step is intended to inform the
next.6 We can think of measured action as straddling the boundary between firstand second-order reasons, or, rather, devising by second-order considerations the
means for enabling first-order choosing. Reducing administration to a choice between first- and second-order decision-making ignores the core of what administrators do.
A prerequisite of measured action in regulatory settings is the formation of
regimes that signal when and where further inquiry is opportune or urgent, and
when additional measures must be taken to further defer final decision or to act
decisively.7 Regimes directed to this purpose arise, for example, when regulators:
induce monitoring of ecosystems for the protection of particular species or the
environment generally; mandate extensive reporting of the failures or side effects of products authorized for sale to detect latent hazards; or organize information-pooling to set or reset (technology-forcing) limits on permissible levels of
pollution as knowledge of what counts as dangerous exposure to the pollutant, the
technologies of pollution control, and the costs of the latter change rapidly and
unpredictably.8 Often resource constraints hamper formation of these regimes;
sometimes their operation is frustrated by raw conflicts of interest or the very rigidities of administrative law that we will discuss in relation to guidance.9 In the
best cases, such regimes allow the agency to cooperate with outside actors–firms,
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NGOs, property owners, other public bodies–to learn what can be known;
together they find a way through uncertainty that none could have found alone.
Are the reasons given to explain and justify the choice of a particular variant
of this kind of rulemaking process, or to evaluate its performance with regard to
a given outcome, unintelligible to lawyers generally, and especially to courts? It is
hard to see why. Evaluation of first-order reason-giving will focus on the validity
of the process by which reasons are produced, because it is easier for outsiders to
judge the suitability of the decision-making process than the substance of an arcane decision. Such outsiders can be expected to ask: Has there been an effort to
canvas all the available evidence? Have competing views been considered and, as
needed, reconsidered? Were channels left open for the easy registration of dissent? Evaluation of the suitability of an information-gathering regime under uncertainty will focus on process in the same way.
In administrative law, this kind of interrogation of the reasoned quality of
decision-making has since the 1970s been associated with “hard-look” judicial review or, more helpfully, process review, to distinguish it from judicial review of
agency conformity to required procedures, or of the overall adequacy of some regulatory output.10 As its name suggests, hard-look review requires an agency to assure that it has given searching consideration to relevant alternatives. From the
first, this check on the conformity of the chain of administrative decision-making
to a minimum standard of rationality has been understood to include the agency’s
response to uncertainty. Perhaps the best statement of the requirements of process
review, the D.C. Circuit’s 1974 opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, held that when an administrator is “obliged to make policy judgments
where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer,
he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.”11
Courts are thus equipped to interrogate agency management of monitoring regimes. Indeed, many of the cases that courts hear in which first-order reasons are
insufficient, leaving the agency to decide by coin toss or appeal to second-order
reasons, arise from the failure of a poorly designed or carelessly operated information-gathering system, with the judge called on to evaluate the legal and practical merits of competing remedies. The question before the court (including in
many of the cases Vermeule cites to illustrate his view of reason-giving under uncertainty) is not only what the agency should do given that it does not have the
information needed to decide, but rather how it got into this situation in the first
place, and what to do about that.12 We are not suggesting that lawyers or courts,
by asking such questions, should take the lead in designing the agency process of
decision-making under uncertainty any more than they currently do. Our point is
only that there is nothing alien to the legal mind in judging the sufficiency of an
agency process against criteria no more or less vague than those used to evaluate
the adequacy of administrative decision-making under more familiar conditions.
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s public and private administrators come to appreciate that they are
working under conditions of real uncertainty, they will seek whenever
possible to make provisional decisions, learn quickly from them, and revise accordingly. They will use guidance, a form of administrative action defined
by its provisionality. Guidance is an extraordinarily heterogeneous category, comprising all those written documents that administrators issue to inform their own
staff and the public at large about how they currently understand and intend to
enforce their legal authorities, whether derived from congressional statute or
prior administrative regulation. As Parrillo notes, guidance comes in countless
forms–“advisories, circulars, bulletins, memos, interpretive letters, enforcement
manuals, fact sheets, FAQs, highlights, you name it”–and is nowhere systematically collected. As a rough estimate, the number of pages of guidance that agencies produce “dwarf[s] that of actual regulations by a factor of twenty, forty, or
even two hundred.”13
Formally, the signal feature of guidance is its provisionality. Agency rules are
generally issued and amended by means of a costly and time-consuming process,
called “notice-and-comment” or “legislative” rulemaking, in which the agency
must elaborately explain its purposes, expose its evidence-gathering and deliberation to public scrutiny, and explain its reactions to criticism. Guidance, in contrast,
can be issued and amended quickly, with little if any formal process.14 Because of
this informality, guidance lacks “the force of law” and thus “the power to bind”
private parties characteristic of agency rules. Guidance is, formally, “only a suggestion–a mere tentative announcement of the agency’s current thinking about
what to do in individual adjudicatory or enforcement proceedings, not something
the agency will follow in an automatic, ironclad manner as it would a legislative
rule.”15 As such, guidance not only permits but demands flexibility: “If a particular individual or firm wants to do something (or wants the agency to do something) that is different than what the guidance suggests, the agency is supposed to
give fair consideration to that alternative approach.”16 Similarly, while an agency
may choose to depart from its guidance without formal process, it should in principle give a reasoned explanation for such departures.17 Understood in this way,
guidance is a tool for measured action.
Yet government-by-guidance has provoked significant legal controversy, for
at least three related reasons.18 First, as notice-and-comment rulemaking became
accepted as the paradigmatic mode of administrative rulemaking, the less procedurally onerous issuance of guidance began to strike some scholars, litigants,
and judges as a potential cheat. As Justice Elena Kagan put it during an oral argument in 2015, this is the recurrent concern that “agencies more and more are using interpretive rules and are using guidance documents to make law and that . . .
it is essentially an end run around the notice and comment provisions.”19 A second, related fear is that because the provisionality of guidance documents makes
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them difficult to challenge in court, agencies can use guidance to evade not only
the pre-issuance notice-and-comment process but also post-issuance judicial review as well.20 A final concern relates to the proliferation of doctrinal deference to
agencies’ interpretation of their statutory mandates and prior regulations. Critics
warn that such deference perversely shelters agency interpretations announced
in guidance documents from judicial scrutiny, even though they do not reflect the
deliberation and evidence-gathering required by the notice-and-comment process or by formal agency adjudication.21
Underlying these technical legal objections are deeper normative concerns
about the relationship of regulation as “current thinking” to conventional forms
of legal authority–legislative, executive, and judicial–that help to explain why
guidance continues to bedevil American courts and legal commentators. Guidance, unlike notice-and-comment rules, cannot be seen as analogous to and directly descended from legislation as a natural outgrowth of the constitutional order. But neither does guidance have the finality that marks the culmination
of lawful executive or judicial action. Unlike prosecutorial indictments and administrative enforcement actions, it does not purport to represent the executive
branch’s determination that a particular private party has violated the law; unlike
administrative orders and judicial decisions, it is not an assessment of the guilt or
liability of an accused party. Guidance is always ripening into a conclusive decision, but it is never ripe; for this reason, unlike administrative rules and orders, it
is not reviewable by the courts as a matter of course.
In the paradigmatic forms of legal decision, the ultimate decision-maker is the
agent of a constitutional principal–the legislature, the executive, the judiciary–
or one of the constitutional principals themselves. Each of the latter is in turn ultimately the agent of the popular sovereign. In general, a principal sets the framework within which decisions are made and reviews an agent’s actions for conformity to its intent. With guidance, and under uncertainty generally, this principal-agent relation breaks down. The framework for decision-making becomes
indistinct as the field of possible actions and the criteria for evaluating them become less and less determinate, especially as seen, by the principal, from afar. The
diligent administrative “agent,” in dialogue with external actors (regulated parties and regulatory beneficiaries) as much as or more than with internal superiors,
is as likely to make decisions presuming new frameworks as to apply old ones.
Accordingly, the same circumstances that make guidance inherently provisional
make it inherently refractory to the forms of control that traditionally confer legal
validity and democratic legitimacy. To the extent that guidance regimes increasingly reflect ongoing collaboration among a hierarchically diverse group of public
and private actors, the content and legal effect of guidance at any given moment
will have an increasingly attenuated (or at least increasingly uncertain) relationship to legislative mandates, presidential directives, or judicial orders. However
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he progressive synthesis is our name for a constellation of arguments that
ground administrative legality and legitimacy in external political control–presidential control in particular–and internal professionalism.
This synthesis is the product of historical evolution, in which elements with different origins co-evolve, in the manner of the components of what would become
the human eye, as they are enlisted into the service of a common function. Like
all evolutionary stories, it has a “just so” aspect. We present it as a fully integrated
whole to highlight its basic institutional and doctrinal commitments.23
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scholastic or opportunistic debates about the legality and legitimacy of guidance
can be, they articulate a very real problem: whether liberal democratic societies are capable of managing uncertainty without reinterpreting what it means to
make law, and the values that underpin lawmaking, when law itself must often be
provisional.
Well-established groups of practitioners in and around the agencies, anticipating our own approach, have over the years proposed working solutions to this
problem, devising new standards by which guidance regimes can be developed
with principled flexibility in mind, while remaining legible to courts and the public at large. The practitioners’ understandings are reflected in a variety of “institutional pronouncements”–by the American Bar Association, the Administrative
Conference of the United States, and guidance about guidance produced by the
agencies themselves–which describe the sorts of reasons that agencies should
be prepared to give to regulated parties, regulatory beneficiaries, and the courts
whenever they depart from or adhere to a practice or norm established by prior
guidance documents.22 Like the commentators who refer approvingly to their
views, the practitioners have no broad program of reform. But it is worth noting
that, since the 1990s, successive cohorts have been at the forefront of such standard-setting, not resistant to it–as conservative fears about the widespread abuse
of guidance might lead one to conclude.
Many liberal and left-leaning scholars, meanwhile, are so intent on defending
the administrative state–conceived along midcentury lines–from conservative
rollback that they are insufficiently attentive to the accumulating innovations in
practice that might provide resources for responding to real deficiencies in the legality and legitimacy of administrative decision-making. Preoccupied with preservation, the progressive defense of the administrative state has given rise to an
organizational and doctrinal synthesis of the governance mechanisms–agency
expertise, presidential oversight, judicial deference–that, taken together, arguably legitimate in a novel and compelling way the traditional, and implicitly unchanging, forms of administrative governance. Below, we present this interpretation of administrative law and indicate its shortcomings as a framework for measured action under uncertainty.
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Here, in outline, are the essentials: Externally, or at the outer boundary of the
administrative state, Congress delegates authority to administrative agencies and
the president directs how agencies wield it. Internally, this authority triggers processes of deliberation and decision conforming to the professional habits and
norms of the scientific and legal experts who work within individual administrative agencies and supervisory institutions, such as the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). Thanks to this layer of professional mediation, the ultimate
expression of congressionally delegated and presidentially directed authority–
administrative decisions–can be expected, most of the time, to be both scientifically rational and legally valid. Energetic and continuing presidential direction,
meanwhile, ensures that administration is not frustrated by the bureaucratic torpor and rivalry common to large organizations, and that decisions have the necessary democratic pedigree, even when they are far removed, in time and effect,
from what Congress might have contemplated when first delegating authority to
a particular agency.24
The synthesis of presidentialism and professionalism is effected by and embodied in internal administrative law: a body of norms, growing out of the practice of administration itself, that harmonizes the demands of political will, legal
regularity, and scientific rationality. In the progressive account, internal administrative law is hierarchical: within agencies, it subordinates lower-level decisionmaking to higher-level review, with the head of the agency as the ultimate authority; within the executive branch, it subordinates agencies to the direction of the
president. Institutionally, the routine operation of these nested hierarchies is policed by super- or meta-agencies–such as the OMB and, within it, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs–housed within the Executive Office of the
President.25
Because presidentialism and professionalism continually imbue administrative decisions with democratic legitimacy, legal validity, and scientific rationality, courts lose their centrality as the guardians of the constitutional conformity
of the administrative state. Partisans of the progressive synthesis rarely disclaim
the virtues of judicial review altogether, but they focus on its vices: the tendency
of courts to subordinate the rationality of the administrative process to their own
professional and political preferences. These limits warrant a general policy of judicial deference to administrative decision-making. More often than not, courts
should avoid reviewing administrative decisions at all; when review is called for,
courts should defer to administrators’ expert views of the meaning of the laws
their decisions implement, the procedures that were necessary to get the job done,
and the evidentiary and policy rationales for deciding one way or another.
Whatever its merits as a response to anti-administrative attacks, the progressive synthesis is deficient in important ways. First, it is conceptually incomplete, if
not incoherent. As has been manifest since the New Deal, decision-making by po-
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f not by the progressive synthesis, how then can administrative law help make
professional expertise and political control usefully commensurate, in ways
that improve the capacity of the administrative state to respond to uncertainty, conform it to minimal liberal democratic norms, and limit the dangers of presidential overreach? We offer a provisional answer to this question in the form of
an alternative doctrinal program and a reminder of the fundamental need for organizational reform.
Our programmatic alternative treats uncertainty not simply as a challenge to
be met, but as a guide. Uncertainty is the great leveler. In revealing the limits of
current knowledge, it limits the claims of authority–all forms of secular authority at least–and presses authorities of all sorts into a more or less open inquiry that
continually updates the nature of a given problem and its provisional solutions.
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litical directive and decision-making by expertise proceed by different methods.
They may reach the same or compatible solutions, but they may not. The synthesis provides no process or principles for systematically reconciling them. Instead,
following the promptings of doctrine, it assumes that both can be exchanged into
the common currency of hierarchy and made interchangeable. But as the countless conflicts between the previous administration and the professional staffs of
the agencies attest, the reality is otherwise. In fact, courts are routinely called on
to decide whether, in a particular case, deference is owed to hierarchical authority
of one kind or another, political or professional. Familiar tensions are recast, not
overcome.26
These tensions point to a second and politically salient defect of the synthesis:
its limited resources for responding to presidential overreach. For the progressive
synthesis, the chief threat to constitutional democracy continues to be, as it has
been since the New Deal, a conservative judiciary and, more generally, the frustration of decisive and synoptic leadership, whatever its origin. Expansive defense
of doctrines of judicial deference to administrative hierarchy responds to the first
danger, while defense of the authority of the Executive Office of the President to
supervise, coordinate, and direct decision-making across the administrative state
responds to the second. But when the corrective of an empowered White House
itself becomes a threat–perhaps the threat–to democratic, lawful, and effective
administration, these responses become worse than useless.
A third deficiency goes to the inadequacy of the progressive synthesis as a response to uncertainty. The synthesis validates authority in its various forms while
seeking to coordinate their exercise. Uncertainty calls authority in all its forms
into question. It does not, to be sure, simply devalue expertise or political leadership. But it emphasizes the role of the expert and the political leader as organizers
of open-ended inquiry, rather than as repositories of tried-and-true solutions that
must merely be adapted to new contexts.
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Such inquiry, moreover, regularly brings to light the interdependence of disparate types of authority, as political action is found to have technical prerequisites
and vice versa. Forms of administrative law and organization that improve the
quality of reason-giving and exchange between the political and technical authorities, and enable courts and the public to better judge these authorities’ respective
claims, make the administrative state more effective in responding to uncertainty
and more likely to respect core liberal democratic norms in doing so.
The alternative program emphasizes that judicial review, despite its susceptibility to ideological capture and prolonged history of anti-administrativism, remains an indispensable tool for resolving conflicts between presidentialism and
professionalism, sociopolitical and sociotechnical reason-giving.27 Current doctrine invites litigants and judges to attack guidance as practically binding regulations that should have gone through the notice-and-comment process. We agree
with the progressive view that this doctrine should be reformed, not least to avoid
formalistic maneuvering on all sides that leaves administrative action less susceptible to post-issuance input, learning, and revision on the fly. But we part company
with the progressive synthesis when it comes to the availability and scope of judicial review of guidance.
The traditional argument against the reviewability of guidance begins in prudence but ends in formalism: guidance is said to lack the finality and ripeness necessary for effective and lawful judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), the Constitution, and the common law. The objection to this argument
is that guidance is so well-suited to regulating in an uncertain world precisely because it encourages participants in the administrative process to act now: to experiment with new technologies and methods of organization, to share information,
and to give reasons why other participants should act differently in light of these
experiments and information exchanges. If a proposed guidance regime is legally
or practically flawed, and that flaw is presently known, it should be presently addressed. Otherwise, the resulting regime risks discouraging the exploration and
experimentation it is meant to foster.28
With respect to the scope of judicial review, the progressive synthesis endorses and would extend a body of doctrine that focuses on whether guidance documents are permissible interpretations of preexisting statutory and regulatory provisions. Instead of asking how well-considered, responsive to objections,
and consistent with prior explanations agency reason-giving is, these doctrines
encourage judges to determine only whether administrators are offering minimally reasonable interpretations of the statutory and regulatory provisions that
authorize them to regulate at all.29 In recent years, progressives have argued that
this type of reasonable-interpretation inquiry should, in most circumstances, be
as narrow and formalistic as possible; a semantically plausible interpretation–an
excuse that can be understood as excusing–is good enough. This formalism may

The Uncertain Future of Administrative Law

200

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/150/3/188/1927441/daed_a_01867.pdf by Columbia University user on 29 September 2021

well limit the extent to which judges interpose their own views for those of administrators, but it does so at the price of obscuring and thus tolerating or even
encouraging incompetent or self-serving decision-making.
Our alternative program would refocus courts and agencies on what some
commentators have called process review: review of the chain of reasoning that has
led an agency to adopt and maintain a particular guidance regime.30 Such review
asks whether the agency’s decisions in the form of guidance are well-considered,
responsive to objections, and consistent with prior explanations of agency behavior and previously established regulatory presumptions. When an agency departs
from prior explanations or presumptions, or chooses to maintain them despite
objections, process review asks whether the agency has acknowledged its departures (or refusals to change course) and whether it has given plausible reasons for
its choices. So described, process review is distinct both from procedural review,
which asks whether a guidance document is so impactful that it should have been
issued by more onerous procedures (such as notice-and-comment rulemaking),
and from outcome review, which asks whether a guidance document is substantively reasonable in light of the evidence the agency had at its disposal. The deferential review of an agency’s interpretive choices preferred by progressives is one
kind of outcome review, while the suspicion that agencies use guidance to avoid
notice-and-comment rulemaking frequently leads conservatives and more classical liberals to advocate an exacting kind of procedural review.31 Process review
steers clear of these extremes and, more importantly, encourages agencies to acknowledge uncertainty and manage it in a reasonable manner.32
Happily, there are resources in current law that permit judicial review of agency action under uncertainty to take the form of process review and, in doing so,
improve the quality of administrative reason-giving. One such resource is hardlook arbitrary and capricious review, the standard that judges apply when reviewing an agency’s exercise of its policy judgment rather than its interpretive acumen.
While hard-look review can resemble either process or outcome review, depending on the kinds of questions that a court asks when assessing an agency’s policy
judgment, the canonical hard-look case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of
the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (1983), nicely exemplifies
the sort of process inquiry we favor.
Another doctrinal resource that already encourages process review is the Skidmore framework.33 Skidmore instructs judges to give weight to an agency’s legal
interpretation according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”34 Subsequent doctrinal developments significantly narrowed the reach of Skidmore in favor of more hierarchically minded, formalistic, and deferential standards, such as Chevron (which
directs judges to accept facially reasonable interpretations of an agency’s ambig-
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uous statutory mandates) and Auer (which directs judges to accept facially reasonable interpretations of an agency’s own ambiguous regulations). These latter
standards are today most vociferously defended by progressives. Recently, however, judges and scholars from across the political spectrum have begun to explore
the possibilities of Skidmore anew.35
In the 2018 Kisor decision, Justice Elena Kagan, whose defense of Clintonian
presidential administration has become a keystone of progressive thinking, wrote
an opinion narrowing the scope of Auer deference, much to the disappointment
of progressive scholars. Kagan’s opinion directed lower court judges to ask a set
of threshold questions before applying Auer when reviewing agency interpretations of their prior regulations. These threshold questions, somewhat analogous
to ones that already confine the application of Chevron in statutory interpretation,
effectively move away from the formalism of Auer and back toward the more holistic Skidmore endeavor of calibrating the degree of deference to the persuasive
quality of agency decision-making.
Our alternative program would accelerate this movement, urging, for example,
that guidance documents always be evaluated under Skidmore, whether they are
construed as interpreting an agency’s prior regulations or its statutory mandates.
Going further, the alternative program would extend Skidmore to notice-and-comment rules, displacing the Chevron framework altogether and thus limiting agency
incentives to regulate in a more inflexible manner when guidance would do.
Of course, the pursuit of Chevron deference is not the primary reason that agencies regulate by notice-and-comment rulemaking. Statutory requirements and judicial expectations, as well as genuine desire for public input, all drive agencies toward the notice-and-comment process, at least some of the time. To the extent that
many so-called statutory requirements are themselves products of judicial interpretation (whether of the APA, an agency’s organic statute, or both), this is another area
where our alternative program would recommend greater, rather than less, judicial
deference. Unless an agency’s organic statute explicitly requires notice-and-comment rulemaking, judges should permit the agency to proceed by guidance.36
Finally, the alternative program would recommend that hard-look review and
the Skidmore inquiry, both understood as process rather than outcome tests, be
used more or less interchangeably. In this way, judicial review of the agency’s reasoning process would converge on a single standard in nearly all cases, mitigating
the incentives agencies have to choose one form of rulemaking (more rather than
less formal) or reason-giving (interpretive rather than policy-based) over another
in order to garner greater judicial deference.37
Together these recommendations recast judicial review, at least with respect
to guidance and thus action under uncertainty, as asking not whether agency decisions possess a sufficiently hierarchical pedigree to merit deference, but whether
they give reasoned explanations for action (or inaction).
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Our alternative program is not, however, simply a call to recenter the courts.
We recognize that internal administrative law and organizational reform are vital
complements to process review as a means of improving agency reason-giving.
The progressive synthesis, however, is drawn to a peculiarly hierarchical conception of internal administrative law. By embedding administration in hierarchy,
the synthesis seeks to reconcile presidentialism and professionalism and, in doing
so, justify a more limited role for the courts. But under uncertainty, this approach
imputes a burden of certitude on technical and political authorities that neither
can bear.
Administrative law scholar Jerry Mashaw’s historical reconstruction of internal administrative law, informed and in some measure inspired by his investigations of decision-making in federal agencies around 1980, suggests an alternative
interpretation, one that is less hierarchical and more capable of managing uncertainty.38 Mashaw understands internal administrative law as a system of quality
control by which an agency corrects flaws in its process of decision-making to better serve its public purpose, where that purpose notably requires the process itself
to be perceived as fair. Internal administrative law as quality control is always relative to the kind of decisions whose quality is in question. When, as was the case
when Mashaw did his empirical research, the public interest was served by the
hierarchical application of fixed rules to decide the validity of individual claims,
internal administrative law aimed to improve the quality of the information available to the hierarchy and the reliability of its treatment of that information. But
when, as is increasingly the case, the public interest under uncertainty is served
by full and fair ventilation of reasons for action in changing contexts that resist
hierarchical control, internal administrative law turns to improving the quality
of those processes. Thus, one of the most thorough recent case studies of internal
administrative law documents such a shift, showing how the Environmental Protection Agency replaced an unworkable standard-setting procedure–which advanced from regulatory goal-setting to the choice of regulatory means in the familiar hierarchical or principal-agent sequence–with a nonhierarchical process
that invites criticism of emergent decisions at each stage of their development.39
Enlarged to include, as it plainly does, nonhierarchical routines, internal administrative law can indeed be an instrument for harmonizing different forms of
expertise. But like judicial review of process, it does so by requiring the clarification of differences, not by assuming that different ways of knowing and deciding
can be ranked according to the degree they are authoritative.
Both process review and internal administrative law, properly understood, can
improve the incentives for sound reason-giving. But neither separately nor together can they substitute for the demanding organizational reform of agencies needed to make principled flexibility a practical routine. For Parrillo, this rewiring of
the circuits of decision-making is paramount: “Mitigating the binding power of
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guidance documents entails interventions that are essentially structural and managerial.”40 His research reminds us again and again of the betwixt-and-between
character of our agencies, with front-line departments rigidly enforcing rules and
a separate, superior department making and revising them, even as questions of
private-sector “compliance” increasingly implicate questions about the advisability of rule changes. Often, we expect, reorganization aimed at overcoming
these barriers to the fluid internal collaboration required for principled flexibility will trigger corresponding changes in internal administrative law; sometimes
revisions of internal law will trigger further institutional reform. In either case,
change requires both reformed practices and new legal norms validating them.
In the end, going beyond the progressive synthesis means allowing administrative innovation in the face of uncertainty to run its course. Like the progressive
defense of the administrative state, our alternative program depends on administrators acting in good faith, most of the time. But the alternative program breaks
with the progressives’ reliance on the formalism of principal-agent relationships
and hierarchically ordered authorities to legitimate administrative action.41 That
reliance is out of character, given progressivism’s origins in a revolt against formalism. But above all, it is self-defeating. Against the conservatives’ formalistic
objections to administrative governance, progressives have taken refuge in a formalism of their own, one that fetters administration with an outmoded model of
decision-making too self-confident for an uncertain world.
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utes and regulations when those interpretations are promulgated in a manner that resembles (but need not replicate precisely) the procedures used in notice-and-comment
rulemaking. See Thomas W. Merrill, To Say What the Law Is: The Supreme Court’s Chevron Doctrine and the Future of the Administrative State (forthcoming). While Merrill’s proposal is very much in the same spirit as our own, we think it is both too demanding and too lax for an uncertain world: agencies should not have to use procedures
that resemble notice-and-comment to merit judicial respect, nor should judges assume
that the use of notice-and-comment-like procedures is an adequate proxy for reasoned
decision-making.

